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I. INTRODUCTION
"Agent X, carry the explosive device through the passenger
lounge and the preboarding metal detector. Keep the triggering
device on your person. Allow the airline authorities to inspect you
and the device. Do not worry; they will not discover our plan."
This dialogue sounds like part of a movie script. Unfortu-
nately, movies are not the only place where such instructions may
be heard today. Terrorist advice may be given to anyone with a
state-of-the-art explosive device who intends to board an airline in
any country. Terrorism no longer knows international borders. 1
1. The United States is generally considered to be a fortress against aviation terror-
ists, but has been unable to live up to this status lately. As of March 1997, terrorist in-
volvement had not been ruled out as a cause of the July 17, 1996 explosion of Trans
World Airlines Flight 800 off New York's Long Island. See John J. Goldman & Eric
Malnic, Investigators Deny Report of Missile Hitting TWA Jet, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 11, 1997,
at A26. Interestingly, terrorist prevention equipment at New York's John F. Kennedy
Airport inspects only incoming luggage, not outgoing luggage like the luggage that possi-
bly caused the Flight 800 disaster. See Otis Port, Where Are the Bomb Sniffers?, Bus.
WK., Aug. 5, 1996, at 78, 78.
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A successful terrorist attack may kill or injure many people under
the airline's control.2 Such a disaster naturally leads to grave trag-
edy and loss, which subsequently may lead to multiple wrongful
death claims against the airline. These claims may bring any air-
line to the brink of bankruptcy, especially if courts allow tradi-
tional damages.
3
Although the framers of the 1929 Convention for the Unifica-
tion of Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation by
Air (Warsaw Convention) 4 did not consider terrorism during the
drafting process, they did share a concern for all airlines' financial
ability to survive a single unfortunate event.5 This concern hinged
on the common view that airlines could be the key to any nation's
economic expansion. 6 Thus, the framers recognized that interna-
tional air carriers could not operate under the constant risk of tra-
ditional damage awards. 7
2. The term "airline" here specifically refers to passenger air carriers. Throughout
the remainder of this Comment, "airline" includes both passenger air carriers and cargo
air transports, consistent with article 1 of the Convention for the Unification of Certain
Rules Relating to International Transportation by Air. See Convention for the Unifica-
tion of Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation by Air, done Oct. 12, 1929,
art. 1(1), 49 Stat. 3000, 3014 [hereinafter Warsaw Convention].
3. For example, on December 15, 1993, three executives of In-N-Out Burger died
after their plane encountered wake turbulence and crashed during its approach to John
Wayne Airport in Irvine, California. See Telephone Interview with Joseph Scully, Avia-
tion Attorney Representing the Plaintiffs in West v. Management Activities, Inc. (Oct. 20,
1996) [hereinafter Scully Interview]. The aircraft was not on an international flight as
defined by the Warsaw Convention. See Warsaw Convention, supra note 2, art. 1(2), at
3014. The parties settled for $20 million. See Scully Interview, supra note 3.
4. See Warsaw Convention, supra note 2.
5. See Onyeanusi v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 767 F. Supp. 654, 656 (E.D. Pa.
1990), affd, 952 F.2d 788 (3d Cir. 1992); Evangelinos v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 396 F.
Supp. 95, 98-99 (W.D. Pa. 1975), rev'd on other grounds, 550 F.2d 152 (3d Cir. 1977)
(stating that one objective of the Warsaw Convention was to provide uniform rules to
limit an air carrier's liability for aircraft accidents).
6. See Andreas F. Lowenfeld & Allan I. Mendelsohn, The United States and the
Warsaw Convention, 80 HARV. L. REV. 497, 499-500 (1967); see also discussion infra Part
V.B.
7. See Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 6, at 499-500. Recently, on November
12, 1996, 350 people died when a Saudi Arabian passenger jet and an Indian passenger
jet, both an international flights, collided in mid-air. See Barry Bearak, 2 Jets Collide in
Air Over India; 350 Are Dead, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 13, 1996, at Al. If willful misconduct is
judicially determined and traditional damage awards are deemed proper, at least one of
the airlines may face bankruptcy. See Scully Interview, supra note 3. With the Warsaw
Convention liability limits and absent a finding of willful misconduct, the airlines stand a
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To alleviate this financial risk, the framers incorporated into
the Warsaw Convention a limit on liability awards.8 This limit
applies to damages compensable to victims of an international air
travel mishap or disaster and their survivors in cases where a court
finds the carrier free of willful misconduct. 9 Although subsequent
agreements have raised the liability limit, 10 many commentators
have vigorously debated eliminating it.11
This Comment explores the Warsaw Convention framers'
concern for financially vulnerable airlines and their decision to
place a limit on airline liability. Part II of this Comment explains
the Warsaw Convention's general purpose and analyzes how that
purpose is realized in the Convention's many provisions, most no-
tably the liability limit provision. Part III discusses the main criti-
cisms of the liability limit. Part IV discusses U.S. federal courts' 12
analyses of the term "willful misconduct" and the courts' progres-
sive lowering of the burden of proof necessary to prove such con-
duct in recent cases involving airborne bombs, terrorist attacks,
hijackings,13 and other international catastrophes. Part V exam-
better chance of continuing operations.
8. See Warsaw Convention, supra note 2.
9. The Warsaw Convention was originally written in French. See id. art. 36, at 3022.
The term "willful misconduct" is a translation of the original French word "dol," which
has no literal English equivalent. Courts today generally accept willful misconduct as the
proper translation. See 8 AM. JUR. 2DAviation § 117 (1980).
10. In 1966, the Order of Civil Aeronautics Board Approving Increases in Liability
Limitations of Warsaw Convention and Hague Protocol (Montreal Agreement) increased
the liability limit from $8,300 to $75,000 per victim or survivor of a decedent in an inter-
national aviation accident. This limit does not apply if the "willful misconduct" exception
applies. See Order-of Civil Aeronautics Board Approving Increases in Liability Limita-
tions of Warsaw Convention and Hague Protocol, reprinted in 49 U.S.C. app. § 1502
(1988) [hereinafter Montreal Agreement]; see also Henry J. Reske, Putting a Price on
Life, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1997, at 23, 23 (stating that the U.S. Department of Transportation
worked out a series of agreements with 19 U.S. and 58 foreign airlines to raise the limit to
$146,000). Article 22 of the Warsaw Convention authorizes carriers and passengers to
agree to a higher liability limit. See Warsaw Convention, supra note 2, art. 22 (1), at 3019.
11. See discussion infra Part III.
12. Because the Warsaw Convention is a treaty, judicial resolution of its provisions in
the United States is exclusively within the jurisdiction of the federal courts and it pre-
empts any conflicting state law. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, ci. 1, art. VI; see also Hill v.
United Airlines, 550 F. Supp. 1048, 1054 (D. Kan. 1982). The Warsaw Convention is the
plaintiff's exclusive remedy. See Onyeanusi v. Pan Am, 952 F.2d 788, 793 (3d Cir. 1992).
13. Courts have considered the hijacking of an airliner to be an accident under article
17 of the Warsaw Convention. See Krystal v. British Overseas Airways Corp., 403 F.
Supp. 1322, 1323 (C.D. Cal. 1975).
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ines the sobering threat of today's state-of-the-art explosive de-
vices, the extent of their ability to pass undetected through porous
and incomplete security measures, 14 and the inadequacy of air-
lines' and governmental responses. Part VI evaluates proposed al-
ternatives to the Warsaw Convention's liability limit. In Part VII,
this Comment concludes that the Warsaw Convention's liability
limit benefits international air carrier passengers and all other
participants in the global marketplace, and thus, should be main-
tained in order to ensure readily available and safe international
air transportation in the future.
II. THE PURPOSE OF THE WARSAW CONVENTION
When a passenger receives injuries while under an airline's
control, 15 these injuries are generally the result of negligence.' 6
Damage awards in wrongful death actions for multiple passengers
in a single air tragedy can easily force an airline into dire financial
straits.17 Awareness of this danger, an appreciation for the value
of transnational air transportation, and a desire to mutually protect
future economic health brought the international community to-
14. Because of the orientation of X-ray machines, machine operators can easily
overlook small amounts of explosives, especially if the explosives are in sheet form. See
Karyn Hodgson, Two Technologies Are Better than One in Bomb Detection, SECURITY
ACCESS CONTROL (Quantum Magnetics, San Diego, Cal.). X-ray machines are used
alone mostly at U.S. airports with international flights.
15. Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention imposes liability for damage sustained in an
accident aboard an aircraft or "in the course of any of the operations of embarking or dis-
embarking." See Warsaw Convention, supra note 2, art. 17, at 3018. Courts have inter-
preted this language to include activity that occurs while the passenger is under an air-
line's "control." See Upton v. Iran Nat'l Airlines Corp., 450 F. Supp. 176, 178 (S.D.N.Y.
1978), aff'd without opinion, 603 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1979). In Upton, the court found that
passengers were not under the airline's "control" because they were in a public waiting
area, not in a restricted area reserved for departing passengers... [and] were free to pro-,
ceed to the airport's restaurant, to visit with nonpassengers, or to exit the building. Id.
16. See infra notes 129-130 and accompanying text. See generally RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 282 (1965).
17. This is particularly true for airlines in Third World countries that lack substantial
assets, as well as airlines in developed countries that operate in fiercely competitive mar-
kets with low profit margins. See, e.g., SOUTHWEST AIRLINES CO., 1995 ANNUAL
REPORT F3, F18 (1996); UAL CORP., 1995 ANNUAL REPORT 22 (1996) (stating that costs
are calculated to hundredths of a cent per available passenger seat mile and that a nine
percent rise or fall in oil prices can mean the difference between a profitable year and a
losing year).
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gether in Paris in 1925 and again in Warsaw in 1929.18
A. International Air Travel at the Time of the Warsaw Convention
In 1925, during the first stage of what was later called the
Warsaw Convention, and in 1929, during the Warsaw Convention
itself, the world brimmed with optimism over air travel and its po-
tential for economic expansion. 19 Charles Lindbergh and Amelia
Earhart had recently introduced the prospects of air travel to the
world by flying across the Atlantic in 1927 and 1928, respectively. 20
Many foresaw that aircraft could replace the much slower water-
borne methods of developing overseas markets. 21 At the time, Air
France, KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, and Pan American World
Airways (Pan Am) were the world's major airlines. 22 Although
they operated on a very limited international scale, they desired to
expand their operations. 23 Despite the economic challenge of
meeting daunting initial capital outlays that were required to start
international operations, numerous fledgling domestic carriers
similarly wanted to expand into the international market.
24
B. The Warsaw Convention's Objectives
Concerns about international air transportation brought na-
tional representatives together in Paris in 1925 and later in War-
saw in 1929.25 One concern was that liability for a single interna-
tional air disaster could easily render an airline bankrupt, thereby
reducing the airline's lifespan to a matter of luck.26 More impor-
18. See Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 6, at 498.
19. See LAWRENCE B. GOLDHIRSCH, THE WARSAW CONVENTION ANNOTATED 5
(1988). See generally 8 AM. JUR. 2D Aviation, supra note 9, § 117 (discussing the framers'
awareness of air transportation's potential uses, current milestones in aviation history,
and the monopoly potential for airlines able to meet initial outlays).
20. See 8 AM. JUR. 2D Aviation, supra note 9, § 117.
21. See id.
22. See id.
23. See id.
24. See id.
25. See Evangelinos v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 396 F. Supp. 95, 99 (W.D. Pa.
1975), rev'd on other grounds, 550 F.2d 152 (3d Cir. 1977); see also Rosman v. Trans
World Airlines, Inc., 314 N.E.2d 848 (1974) (interpreting part of the Warsaw Conven-
tion's primary objective as limiting air carrier liability for accidents).
26. See Scully Interview, supra note 3.
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tantly, airline and national representatives feared that such liabil-
ity would be the proverbial "straw that broke the camel's back" in
discouraging airlines from initiating international air travel, espe-
cially to countries where negligence law worked in favor of acci-
dent victims and harshly against airlines. 27 Without a cap on an
airline's potential liability, worldwide economic development
would polarize between countries that could bear the formidable
liability risk and countries with airlines that could not.
Realizing the need to promote the aviation industry and pro-
tect airlines, the Warsaw Convention framers decided that the
Convention's "overriding goal" would be to provide "'necessary
protection of a financially weak industry and [to ensure] that catas-
trophical risks would not be borne by the air carriers alone.'
28
The Warsaw Convention states that its provisions shall be applied
to all cases worldwide, regardless of local tort law, whenever an
aircraft is hired to transport someone or something on an interna-
tional route.29 The Convention also provides uniform rules relat-
ing to air transportation documents, such as tickets, baggage
checks, and air waybills. 3
0
C. The Warsaw Convention's Significant Provisions and Their
Practical Application
Overall, the Warsaw Convention limits the acceptable theo-
ries of liability and the permissible amounts of damages for air dis-
asters.31 First, the signatories made the Warsaw Convention the
exclusive remedy to equalize differing legal treatment of aviation
disasters in various countries.32 The Convention provides an inde-
pendent cause of action, thereby preempting state law. 33
27. See Onyeanusi v. Pan Am., 952 F.2d 788, 792 (3d Cir. 1992).
28. Oyneanusi v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 767 F. Supp. 654, 656 (E.D. Pa.
1990), affd, 952 F.2d 788 (3d Cir. 1992) (quoting Floyd v. Eastern Airlines, 872 F.2d 1262,
1467 (11th Cir. 1989)) (alteration in original).
29. See Warsaw Convention, supra note 2, art. 1(1), at 3014.
30. See id. arts. 3-8, at 3015-17; see also Evangelinos, 396 F. Supp. at 98-99.
31. See In re Aircrash in Bali, Indonesia, 684 F.2d 1301, 1308 (9th Cir. 1982) (stating
that, under the U.S. Constitution, the Warsaw Convention preempts state law, and thus,
the Warsaw Convention's limitation on liability was applicable).
32. See Boehringer-Mannheim Diagnostics, I.nc. v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 737
F.2d 456,458 (5th Cir. 1984).
33. See id.
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Second, the Warsaw Convention limits the amount and types
of damages recoverable for air tragedies. 34 Article 17 of the War-
saw Convention limits recovery to compensatory damages.35 Ar-
ticle 25 does not allow punitive damage awards even if plaintiffs
establish that damages resulted from the carrier's willful miscon-
duct.36 Because the Warsaw Convention preempts substantive
state law, the Convention also preempts any claim for punitive
damages under state law-anything else would be contrary to the
Convention's basic premises.37
Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention provides:
The carrier shall be liable for damage sustained in the event of
the death or wounding of a passenger or any other. bodily injury
suffered by a passenger, if the accident which caused the dam-
age so sustained took place on board the aircraft or in the
course of any of the operations of embarking or disembark-
ing.38
Courts have interpreted article 17 as making liability, and
therefore damages, dependent on three factors: (1) location of the
accident; (2) activity in which the injured person was engaged; and
(3) the defendant's control over the injured person at the location
of the accident and during the activity taking place at the time of
the accident. 39 The airline's control of a passenger extends from
the passenger's embarkation onto the aircraft to disembarkation
from the aircraft, but not to when the airline no longer controls a
34. See Warsaw Convention, supra note 2, arts. 17, 19, 22, 25, at 3018-20; see also
Harpalani v. Air-India, Inc., 634 F. Supp. 797, 799 (N.D. II1. 1986); In re Air Disaster at
Lockerbie, Scot., 733 F. Supp. 547, 550-51 (E.D.N.Y. 1990), aff'd, 928 F.2d 1267 (2d Cir.
1991) (holding that representatives of the hundreds killed over Scotland could not recover
punitive damages because the Warsaw Convention, with its original purpose to promote
the then-fledgling civil aviation industry, barred punitive damage claims regardless of
whether there was willful misconduct).
35. See Warsaw Convention, supra note 2, art. 17, at 3018.
36. See id. art. 25, at 3020; see also Harpalani, 634 F. Supp. at 799 (stating that no
court has awarded punitive damages under the Warsaw Convention); In re Air Disaster at
Lockerbie, Scot., 928 F.2d at 1285.
.37. See Floyd v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 872 F.2d 1462, 1484-85 (11th Cir. 1989), rev'd
on other grounds, 499 U.S. 530 (1991).
38. Warsaw Convention, supra note 2, art. 17, at 3018.
39. See Evangelinos v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 550 F.2d 152, 155 (3d Cir. 1977)
(stating the generally accepted analysis for determining liability).
[Vol. 19:633640
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passenger's safety.
40
The framers defined "bodily injury" to include only physical
manifestations of harm.41 Although emotional trauma cannot
constitute "bodily injury," the Warsaw Convention allows loss of
consortium claims.42 For example, the husband of a passenger,
who was injured when an airline attendant spilled coffee on her
during an international flight, was allowed to assert an independ-
ent cause of action under the Warsaw Convention for loss of con-
sortium due to his wife's injuries.
43
A plaintiff pursuing a claim for physical injuries, on a theory
of liability under the Warsaw Convention, must adhere to a two-
year statute of limitations.44 This statute of limitations may exceed
40. See Warsaw Convention, supra note 2, art. 17, at 3018. For example, a court
found an airline not liable for injuries to passengers resulting from a terrorist attack in the
airport's baggage claim area. See Martinez Hernandez v. Air Fr., 545 F.2d 279, 279 (5th
Cir. 1976). The court reasoned that the passengers were no longer disemba'king because
they were free to roam through the terminpl with no direction from airline personnel. See
id. at 283; see also Berman v. Trans World Airlines, 421 N.Y.S.2d 291, 292-93 (Civ. Ct.
1979) (holding that the Warsaw Convention's "transportation by air" is complete when
passengers are allowed to enter an unrestricted area of the terminal). In Berman, the
court stated that the airline could not revive control, once relinquished, for the liability
limit on baggage damage. See id. Thus, the airline's subsequent election to retake control
of plaintiff's luggage did not cap liability. See id.
41. In one case, emotional trauma resulting from abduction by hijackers was found
not to constitute bodily injury. See Burnett v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 368 F. Supp.
1152, 1157 (D.N.M. 1973); see also Rosman v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 314 N.E.2d 848,
855 (1974) (holding that "'bodily injury' as used in article 17 [of the Warsaw Convention]
connotes palpable, conspicuous physical injury, and excludes mental injury with no ob-
servable 'bodily', as distinguished from 'behavioral,' manifestations"). In Rosman, Arab
guerrillas in the Jordanian desert held passengers captive near the aircraft. See 314
N.E.2d at 850. The defendant carrier was liable for the passengers' "palpable, objective
bodily injuries, including those caused by the psychic trauma of the hijacking, and for the
damages flowing from those bodily injuries." Id. at 857. The carrier was not liable, how-
ever, for the trauma or nonbodily injuries or possible behavioral manifestations of the
trauma. See id. In contrast, seemingly transitory but certain physical harm suffered as a
result of food poisoning from an inflight meal does constitute "injury" under the Warsaw
Convention. See Halmos v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 727 F. Supp. 122 (S.D.N.Y.
1989).
42. See Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530, 551 (1991) (stating that the War-
saw Convention does not allow emotional distress claims); Diaz Lugo v. American Air-
lines, Inc., 686 F. Supp. 373, 376 (D.P.R. 1988) (stating that the Warsaw Convention does
allow a loss of consortium claim).
43. See Diaz Lugo, 686 F. Supp. at 376.
44. The two-year statute of limitations in article 29(1) of the Warsaw Convention
applies to actions based upon negligence and willful misconduct. See Stone v. Mexicana
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a state's statute of limitations on similar causes of action. 45 The
lengthened statute of limitations gives potential plaintiffs more
opportunity to bring a lawsuit, thereby denying defendant airlines
equal protection of the laws.
Upon balancing the Warsaw Convention's provisions against
current terrorist threats, it is clear that the Convention's liability
limit must remain in effect.46 The cost of anti-terrorism devices
and a plaintiff's ability to recover over $75,000 following a finding
of willful misconduct have erected new barriers to potential en-
trants in the airline industry. Existing and potential airlines, espe-
cially in Third World countries, with minimal financial strength,
have been reduced to financially vulnerable units. The threat of
and precautions against terrorist activity have renewed the rele-
vance of the purpose of the Warsaw Convention's liability limit.
III. WORLDWIDE OUTRAGE AT THE WARSAW CONVENTION
The Warsaw Convention created immediate outrage in its
signatory countries.47 The main criticism regarded the liability
Airlines, Inc., 610 F.2d 699, 700 (10th Cir. 1979). The Warsaw Convention's drafters did
riot intend the statute of limitations in article 29(1) to result in different periods of limita-
tion depending upon the type of conduct giving rise to a cause of action. See id. Because
airplanes often travel through many jurisdictions, the framers determined that a uniform
statute of limitations was desirable. See id.
45. See CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 340(3) (West 1982) (stating that the statute of limi-
tations on a negligence action for personal injuries is one year); id. § 340(99) (stating that
the statute of limitations on a cause of action for loss of consortium is one year).
46. The U.S. Tiansportation Department does not share this view. Recently, it de-
clared that it would allow airlines to lift the limit on liability for people killed or injured
on an international flight. See Liability Limit Lifted on International Crashes, L.A. TIMES,
Nov. 13, 1996, at D3. The change, effective November 12, 1996, allows passengers and
their families to recover unlimited damages if the defendant airline voluntarily joins in the
agreement. See id. Approximately 65 airlines worldwide have already joined in the
agreement. Airlines may choose, however, to remain under the protections of the War-
saw Convention. Over one hundred airlines have chosen to remain under the limit. See
Scully Interview, supra note 3.
47. Over 120 countries, including both highly industrialized countries and struggling
Third-World countries, are signatories. The signatories are Afghanistan, Algeria, Anti-
gua, Australia [extended to Norfolk Island], Austria, the Bahamas, Bangladesh, Barba-
dos, Barbuda, Belgium, Benin, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Cameroon, Canada
[with reservation], Chile [with reservation], China, Colombia, Congo, Cuba [with reser-
vation], Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt,
Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana,
Greece, Grenada, Guinea, Guyana, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ire-
land, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Kenya, Kiribati, Democratic People's Re-
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limit. Criticism has grown louder and stronger as inflation has
raced ahead of increases in the limit.48 In addition, the willful mis-
conduct exception has sparked cries of equal protection and due
process violations.49 Indeed, $75,000 is often inadequate compen-
sation for victims of an international flight mishap or their surviv-
ing family members. 50
Nevertheless, numerous erroneous assumptions underlie the
contentions of opponents to the liability limit. Opponents first
lash out at "corporate America, ' 51 falsely assuming that U.S. air-
lines can afford any judgment amount. Another assumption relies
on a stereotype of airline executives as lazy, insensitive, and so-
public of Korea, Kuwait, Laos, Latvia, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Mada-
gascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Mo-
rocco, Nauru, Nepal, Netherlands [extended to Curacao], New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria,
Norway, Oman, Pakistan [with reservation], Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Philippines,
Poland, Portugal, Romania, Rwanda, St. Lucia, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra
Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, South Africa [extended to Namibia], Spain, Sri
Lanka, Sudan, Surinam, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Tanza-
nia, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Tuvalu, Uganda, [former] Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom [extended to Ascension Islands, Bermuda,
British Virgin Islands, Brunei, Caicos, Cayman Islands, Channel Islands, Falkland Islands
and dependencies, Gibraltar, Hong Kong, Isle of Man, Montserrat, St. Christopher-Nevis,
St. Helena, Turks, and Belize (application not yet determined)], United "States [with res-
ervation], Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Republic of Vietnam, Western Samoa,
Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. See Warsaw Convention, supra note
2, at 3014. This wide range of signatory nations demonstrates that the Warsaw Conven-
tion appealed and continues to appeal to nations that have stronger economic means as
well as those that need its protections.
48. See Lee S. Kreindler, The Denunciation of the Warsaw Convention, 31 J. AIR L. &
CoM. 291 (1965). See generally Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 6 (reviewing the
main criticisms of the Warsaw Convention).
49. For example, the Warsaw Convention does not assure the right to a jury trial. See
Noel v. Linea Aeropostal Venezolana, 144 F. Supp. 359, 361 (S.D.N.Y. 1956). But see In
re Korean Air Lines Disaster, 798 F. Supp. 750, 752 (D.D.C. 1992) (holding that wrongful
death claims arising out of the 1983 Korean Air Lines Flight 007 disaster, in which a So-
viet military jet shot down a civilian airline, could be tried before a jury for resolution of
damage issues, even though the location of the plane crash satisfied the admiralty case
requirements of the Death on the High Seas Act (D.O.H.S.A.), 46 U.S.C. app. § 761-768
(1994). In In re Korean Air Lines Disaster, the court had jurisdiction concurrently based
on article 28(2) of the Warsaw Convention and the D.O.H.S.A. See 798 F. Supp. at 755.
Furthermore, the entire case could have been tried before a jury because the plaintiff
combined the arguably non-jury wrongful death claims under the Warsaw Convention
with the D.O.H.S.A. claims that could be tried before a jury. See id.
50. See Warsaw Convention, supra note 2, art. 1, at 3014 (requiring a flight to be in-
ternational in order for plaintiffs to recover).
51. See generally Kreindler, supra note 48.
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cially irresponsible individuals, selfishly pursuing personal wealth
at the expense of public safety. Liability limit opponents believe
that examples should be made of these corporations. Thus, they
believe that other similarly-minded corporations seeking to hide
behind well-paid. corporate defense counsel, who cleverly use the
law to squeeze out less wealthy plaintiffs, will become weary.
52
Opponents also misinterpret the willful misconduct exception
to mean that willful misconduct only occurs when an airline
knowingly and purposely sabotages its own aircraft or equip-
ment.53 Because such self-inflicted acts would be rare, opponents
believe that the $75,000 liability cap will almost always shelter an
airline. This perception of a high burden of proof is, however, in-
consistent with current law. U.S. federal courts interpret the Or-
der of Civil Aeronautics Board Approving Increases in Liability
Limitations of Warsaw Convention and Hague Protocol (Montreal
Agreement) as amending the Warsaw Convention to foreclose
even the due care defense, 54 making the burden of proof lower
than in traditional negligence actions.55 Thus, on a practical level,
plaintiffs have to meet a lower burden when involved in an inter-
national aviation accident than when involved in a domestic avia-
tion accident.
52. For example, suppose a Los Angeles-based husband and wife purchase airline
tickets to Europe. The wife, possibly because of ticket sale promotions, buys a series of
one-way tickets, first to New York and then to London, while the husband purchases a
single round-trip ticket. If the aircraft exploded over Ohio, absent willful misconduct, the
airline would be insulated from damages exceeding $75,000 for the husband, but a claim
brought by the wife's survivor would not be subject to the Warsaw Convention limit.
Thus, the wife's survivor could collect much more than $75,000. Survivors may not, how-
ever, be able to afford the potentially costly litigation due to the airline's legal -tactics,
such as propounding "mountains" of discovery requests and deposition notices. See
Scully Interview, supra note 3.
53. These opponents often rely on a holding that, when somewhat distorted, does
support this view. See Berner v. British Commonwealth Pac. Airlines, Ltd., 346 F.2d 532,
536-37 (2d Cir. 1965) (stating that knowledge of the fact that damage would probably re-
sult is a necessary element of "willful misconduct" within the meaning of article 25(1) of
the Warsaw Convention).
54. See Evangelinos v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 396 F. Supp. 95, 100 (W.D. Pa.
1975), rev'd on other grounds, 550 F.2d 152, 159 (3d Cir. 1977); see also Air Fr. v. Saks,
470 U.S. 392, 407 (1985) (stating that the Montreal Agreement does not impose absolute
liability on air carriers, except that "an airline cannot defend a claim on the ground that it
took all necessary measures to avoid the injury").
55. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 282 (1965) (asserting that the law rec-
ognizes the due care defense in a negligence action).
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A. Due Process: Critics Claim that the Presumption of Liability
Limit Violates an Airline's Due Process Rights
In negligence actions in the United States, a plaintiff must
show facts that the defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff and sub-
sequently breached that duty.56 Determining whether the defen-
dant has breached that duty is a decision for the trier of fact.57
The plaintiff must also prove causation by showing that the defen-
dant's breach was both the actual and proximate cause of the
plaintiff's damages. 58
The Warsaw Convention, effectively eliminates a defense of
due care, thus establishing a presumption of liability in exchange
for a low liability limit when a mishap occurs.59 Thus, the Warsaw
Convention deprives airlines of the ability to plead facts that show
a duty of care has not been breached. The only remaining issue is
whether the airline can prove that it did not engage in willful mis-
conduct.60 This presumption essentially shifts the burden of proof
to the defendant and raises substantive and procedural due process
concerns for defendant airlines.
Unlike other defendants in negligence actions, airlines are un-
able to contest the existence of a breach. For example, an airline
was unable to defend against a pregnant passenger's claim that she
miscarried due to a bomb threat received after she boarded the
aircraft by stating that it took all available responsive actions. 61
An airline may only overcome the presumption of liability by
showing that it did not proximately cause the passenger's injuries.
For example, in Margrave v. British Airways,62 the defendant air-
line successfully demonstrated that it was not liable for a passen-
ger's back injuries allegedly resulting from sitting through a two-
56. See id.
57. See id.
58. See id.
59. The Warsaw Convention "essentially created a presumption of liability on the
part of [an] air carrier for injury or death.., without proof of fault." Day v. Trans World
Airlines, Inc., 393 F. Supp. 217, 221 (S.D.N.Y.), affd, 528 F.2d 31 (2d Cir. 1975).
60. See generally id.
61. See Salerno v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 606 F. Supp. 656, 657-58 (S.D.N.Y.
1985).
62. 643 F. Supp. 510 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
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hour flight delay due to a bomb threat.63 In that case, the plaintiff
was unable to produce sufficient evidence to show that the airline,
and not her pre-existing back problem, was the proximate cause of
her injury, and therefore, could not rebut the airline's causation
defense. 64 Thus; under the Warsaw Convention, airlines can only
hope for a defense verdict by pleading lack of proximate cause.
B. Equal Protection: Critics Claim that the Convention Arbitrarily
Classifies Plaintiffs by Its Definition of International Flight
The amount potentially recoverable by a plaintiff residing in a
Warsaw Convention signatory nation entirely depends on whether
the flight is domestic or international. 65 The Warsaw Convention
covers international flights but not domestic flights.66 Thus, the
locations of a passenger's embarkation and disembarkation de-
termines the amount the plaintiff may recover.67
A flight's international status, generally has, however, little ef-
fect on the air carrier's negligence. French ice and turbulence are
no more or less challenging to a pilot's control of an aircraft origi-
nating from France than are Spanish ice and turbulence to the
same pilot. U.S. runways are no more or less difficult to land on or
to take off from than are Japanese runways. Baggage and person-
nel scanners become no more or less effective when used in Can-
ada for domestic flights than when used in Mexico for interna-
tional flights. Nonetheless, an Italian citizen who is injured while
flying to England or walking in an English baggage area and while
still under an Italian airline's control is limited in recovery because
the passenger is on an international flight under the Warsaw Con-
vention. The Warsaw Convention's liability limit does not govern
that same Italian if the negligent airline is on a domestic flight, 68
63. See id. at 513.
64. See id. at 514-15.
65. See Warsaw Convention, supra note 2, art. 1, at 3014.
66. See id.
67. See id.
68. Extending the liability limit to cover domestic flights arguably may further the
Warsaw Convention's purpose of safeguarding the future of international air travel. In-
deed, many international flights rely on a healthy system of domestic air transportation.
U.S. courts have held, however, that a rationally related statute may be underinclusive.
See New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303-05 (1976) (holding that tourism benefits
justified classification favoring pushcart vendors of certain longevity); Railway Express
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even though the risks are substantially the same on both flights.
This type of distinction can easily be seen as arbitrary line-
drawing.69 Although it seems like a denial of equal protection,
U.S. courts have consistently ruled otherwise.
70
As passengers on international flights, victims from signatory
nations are not made whole by today's generally accepted personal
injury recovery principles. 71 Compensatory damages of $75,000
may not even cover hospital fees. 72 Neither emotional distress
damages73 nor punitive damages are allowed.74 The Warsaw Con-
vention is the exclusive remedy for citizens in the signatory na-
tions.75 Given its liability limit, the Warsaw Convention is consid-
Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 109-10 (1949) (holding that potential traffic haz-
ards justified exemption of vehicles advertising the owner's products from protection un-
der exception to the general advertising ban). In these cases, the factual context and
scope of the statutes were sufficient to uphold the statutes.
69. Admittedly, the classification does not merit heightened scrutiny because it in-
volves neither a fundamental right nor a suspect class, such as race, alienage, nationality,
gender, or illegitimacy. The line arguably, however, is arbitrarily drawn. Furthermore,
countervailing public policy interests strongly suggest that applying the Warsaw Conven-
tion liability limit to domestic flights would more effectively protect airlines.
70. See Indemnity Ins. Co. v. Pan Am. Airways, Inc., 58 F. Supp. 338, 339-40
(S.D.N.Y. 1944) (holding that, in ratifying the Warsaw Convention, Congress acted within
its power to regulate commerce, and thus, the treaty is neither an unconstitutional denial
of equal protection or due process in'the deprivation of property); Lindsley v. Natural
Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911) (holding that a basic tenet of equal protection
law is that a classification does not fail "merely because it is not made with mathematical
nicety or because in practice it- results in some inequality"). Although this Comment
deals with U.S. courts' treatment of the Warsaw Convention, it is fair to posit that the
world will and does generally follow the United States in its legal interpretation of trea-
ties because of U.S. military and economic strength.
71. See Scully Interview, supra note 3 (stating that, in West v. Management Activities,
Inc., if the flight had been defined as international under the Warsaw Convention, the ex-
ecutives' heirs would have received only $75,000 each).
72. Hospital fees may approach $150,000 for care related to multiple broken bones,
bruises, internal injuries, and reasonable complications, assuming that there are compli-
cations. See Interview with Dr. Thomas Chambers, Veterans' Administration, San Diego,
Cal., in San Diego, Cal. (Jan. 17, 1997).
73. See Floyd v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 872 F.2d 1462, 1478-80 (11th Cir. 1989), rev'd
on other grounds, 499 U.S. 530 (1991) (holding that the Warsaw Convention originally
intended to deny emotional distress damages); Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968)
(defining the damages required for a plaintiff to recover for emotional distress).
74. See Harpalani v. Air-India, Inc, 634 F. Supp. 797, 799 (N.D. Ill. 1986); see also
discussion supra Part II.C.
75. See Abramson v. Japan Airlines Co., 739 F.2d 130, 134.(3d Cir. 1984). This re-
striction is arguably unjust considering the damages that decedents' survivors could claim
for an entire professional sports team killed aboard an international flight that crashes.
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ered only a partial remedy.
IV. COURTS HAVE PROGRESSIVELY LOWERED THE STANDARD OF
PROOF NECESSARY TO SHOW WILLFUL MISCONDUCT
Since the enactment of the Warsaw Convention, courts pro-
gressively have eased the standard for plaintiffs to prove defendant
airlines liable of willful misconduct. The defendant's duty of care
has progressively risen, effectively lowering the plaintiff's burden
of proof.76 Consequently, the $75,000 ceiling has been increasingly
pierced. Thus, the Warsaw Convention's liability limit must re-
main in effect to prevent potentially enormous judgments against
airlines.
In 1949, just twenty years after the Warsaw Convention's
signing, only proof of a pilot's flagrant willful misconduct would
sustain a jury verdict above the liability limit. For example, in
1949, a court found willful misconduct by a defendant airline's pi-
lot when a passenger carrier crashed after flying at an altitude of
only 4000 feet where charts showed that nearby mountains were
between 3500 and 4000 feet high.77 The aircraft also violated civil
air regulations that required scheduled air carriers to fly no less
than 1000 feet above the highest obstacle.78
Today, proving willful misconduct is relatively easy.79 For ex-
See Scully Interview, supra note 3.
76. Current law directs courts to liberally define an "accident" under article 17 of the
Warsaw Convention after assessing all the circumstances. See Air Fr. v. Saks, 470 U.S.
392, 405 (1985). If an injury indisputably results from a passenger's own internal reaction
to an aircraft's usual, normal, and expected operation, however, courts will not find that
an accident occurred, and article 17 will not apply. See id. at 403.
77. See American Airlines, Inc. v. Ulen, 186 F.2d 529, 533-34 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
78. See id. This point is not intended to suggest that courts cannot find willful mis-
conduct absent concurrent violation of an aviation regulation. In the case regarding the
explosion of a Pan Am jet over Lockerbie, Scotland, however, the court found that Pan
Am's failure to comply with minimum Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) baggage
handling procedures, which may have allowed the bomb to pass undetected, constituted
willful misconduct. See In re Air Disaster at Lockerbie, Scot., 37 F.3d 804, 811-12 (2d Cir.
1994), cert. denied, Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., v. Pagnucco, 115 S. Ct. 934 (1995).
79. One of many factqrs contributing to this trend is the Montreal Agreement's re-
moval of the due care defense. See Montreal Agreement, supra note 10. Another factor
may simply be judicial recognition that the liability limit provides minimal recovery to
successful plaintiffs. In addition, the harsh treatment that noncarriers have received in
.product liability actions arising from the same crash supports this point. The liability cap
does not shelter non-carriers, such as engine manufacturers and airframe builders. See
Interview with Ted Green, Aviation Insurance Agent, in Beverly Hills, Cal. (Dec. 17,
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ample, one court held that in an action to recover damages for per-
sonal injuries arising out of a hijacking, the plaintiffs were entitled
to recover $75,000 under article 17 of the Warsaw Convention
without any proof of the carrier's negligence.80 In addition, if the
plaintiffs could prove damages in excess of $75,000, they would be
permitted to attempt to prove willful misconduct by showing the
inadequacy of the airline's anti-hijacking procedures. 81
More commonly, courts have expanded the means available
for a plaintiff to prove willful misconduct. 82 For example, a plain-
tiff can prove willful misconduct from a defendant's intentional
misrepresentation. 83 In addition, a plaintiff who is injured while
standing in line to board an aircraft may attempt to prove willful
misconduct in defendant's inadequate security provisions. 84 Fur-
ther, the family of a victim who drowns incident to a crash may as-
1996) [hereinafter Green Interview].
80. See Harari-Raful v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 341 N.Y.S.2d 655, 658 (App. Div.
1973). Although Harari-Raful suggests that the willful misconduct requirement is becom-
ing nothing more than a pleading formality, this rule is not consistently reflected in other
decisions. For a different treatment of the willful misconduct requirement, see Ospina v.
Trans World Airlines, Inc., 975 F.2d 35, 37 (2d Cir. 1992), which held there was that in-
sufficient evidence to support a finding of willful misconduct. In Ospina, the airline
complied with FAA procedures and other countries' laws regarding the search of the air-
craft's cabin and cockpit, but failed to discover a bomb in the cockpit that exploded. and
killed four people. See id.
81. See Ospina, 975 F.2d at 38.
82. See Floyd v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 872 F.2d 1462, 1473 (11th Cir. 1989), rev'd on
other grounds, 499 U.S. 530 (1991) ("The terms of the [Warsaw] Convention must be con-
strued broadly in order to advance its goals."); Onyeanusi v. Pan Am, 952 F.2d 788, 793
(3d Cir. 1992) ("[T]he purposes of the [Warsaw] Convention must be furthered 'to the
greatest extent possible, even if that entails rejecting a literal reading' of the Conven-
tion." (quoting Benjamins v. British European Airways, 572 F.2d 913, 918 (2d Cir.
1978))).
83. See Hill v. United Airlines, 550 F. Supp. 1048, 1054 (D. Kan. 1982).
84. Courts have held that passengers were "embarking" within the meaning of article
17 of the Warsaw Convention when a terrorist attack took place. See Leppo v. Trans
World Airlines, Inc., 392 N.Y.S.2d 660, 661-62 (App. Div. 1977); Day v. Trans World Air-
lines, Inc., 393 F. Supp. 217, 221-22 (S.D.N.Y.), affd, 528 F.2d 31, 33-34 (2d Cir. 1975). In
Leppo, the passengers had submitted their tickets, received boarding passes, checked in
their baggage, and passed through passport inspection. See 392 N.Y.S. 2d at 661. They
were lined up in front of the departure gate to participate in boarding searches when the
terrorist attack took place. See id. at 661-62. In Day, the passengers had surrendered
their tickets, passed through passport control and entered an area reserved exclusively for
passengers about to depart on international flights. See 528 F.2d at 33. They were not
free to roam through the terminal because the carrier's agents required them to stand in
line and undergo a weapons search before boarding. See id.
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sert the defendant's willful misconduct. 85 For example, KLM
Royal Dutch Airlines Holland (KLM) could not benefit from the
liability cap in a wrongful death suit.86 In that suit, a passenger
drowned after a KLM plane crashed. 87 The jury found that KLM's
failure "to establish and execute [instructions for] passengers as to
the location and use of life vests was a conscious and willful omis-
sion to perform a positive duty and constituted reckless disregard
of the consequences.
88
Similarly, in recent years, U.S. federal courts have allowed
damages that previous courts would likely have denied.89 In addi-
tion, courts have broadened the class of potential plaintiffs who
may bring a claim under the Warsaw Convention. For example, in
the shooting down of Korean Air Lines Flight 007 over the former
Soviet Union by a military jet, the court broadly interpreted article
24(2) of the Warsaw Convention which provides that a suit for
"damages sustained" may be brought "however founded" and
"without prejudice to questions as to who are persons who have
the right to bring suit," 90 and held that the mother and sis-
85. See Koninklijke Luchtvaart Maatschappij N.V. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines Hol-
land v. Tuller, 292 F.2d 775, 779 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
86. See id.
87. See id.
88. Id.
89. For example, in In re Inflight Explosion on Trans World Airlines, Inc. Aircraft
Approaching Athens, Greece, the court upheld an $85,000 jury award for the conscious
pain and suffering that an air passenger experienced between his physical wounding and
death as appropriate under the Warsaw Convention. See In re Inflight Explosion on Trans
World Airlines, Inc., Aircraft Approaching Athens, Greece, 778 F. Supp. 625, 641
(E.D.N.Y. 1991), rev'd on other grounds and remanded, sub nom. Ospina v. Trans World
Airlines, Inc., 975 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1992). The passenger was seated on top of a bomb, and
when the bomb exploded, the passenger did not die immediately from the blast. See id. at
626. Experts estimated that the passenger probably lived five to ten seconds after the
blast and realized that he was plunging to his death. See id. at 627. The court allowed
damages for conscious pain and suffering because they "were neither speculative nor pu-
nitive, but rather to compensate the survivor for the actual harm the decedent experi-
enced," and were consistent with the Warsaw Convention. Id. at 644. In Husserl v. Swiss
Air Transportation Co., the court held that a passenger, who was forced to spend time in a
hotel as a result of a terrorist hijacking, was considered to have spent time "on board the
aircraft" within the meaning of article 17 of Warsaw Convention. See Husserl v. Swiss
Air Transp. Co., 388 F. Supp. 1238, 1247 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). "The time 'on board the air-
craft' included all of the time between embarkation at the origin of [the] flight and disem-
barkation at [the] scheduled destination of [the] flight." Id.
90. Warsaw Convention, supra note 2, art. 24(2), at 3020; see In re Korean Air Lines
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ter/executrix of a passenger aboard the airplane could "recover for
decedent's conscious pain and suffering, for loss of support, mental
injury and grief..., loss of love, affection and companionship, loss
of inheritance, and lost services." 91 Another court handling this
tragedy determined that willful misconduct caused the aircraft's
poor navigation.
92
The courts have even accommodated inflationary concerns by
allowing prejudgment interest on damage awards both not exceed-
ing and exceeding the Warsaw Convention $75,000 liability limit.93
Prejudgment interest is computed by discounting the entire award
back to the date of the accident and then compounding that
amount at the prime interest rate.9
4
Because courts have significantly decreased the threshold for
proving willful misconduct and broadened the areas of recovery,
the Warsaw Convention's liability limit must remain to prevent po-
tentially enormous judgments against airlines.
V. THE INCREASED THREAT FROM THE IMPROVED ABILITY OF
EXPLOSIVE DEVICES TO PASS UNDETECTED THROUGH SECURITY
SYSTEMS
The courts' flexibility in recent airline disaster cases demon-
strates courts' recognition that the willful misconduct determina-
tion tremendously affects an airline's liability and a victim's recov-
ery. The increased threat from the improved ability of explosive
devices to pass undetected through security systems brings into fo-
Disaster, 807 F. Supp. 1073, 1080 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
91. In re Korean Air Lines Disaster, 807 F. Supp. at 1089. But see Zicherman v. Ko-
rean Air Lines, Co., 116 S. Ct. 629, 636 (1996) (holding that victims of the flight could not
recover non-pecuniary damages under the D.O.H.S.A.); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higgin-
botham, 436 U.S. 618, 625-26 (1978) (holding that -plaintiffs could not recover non-
pecuniary damages, such as loss of society, under the D.O.H.S.A.). It remains unclear,
however, if a case under only the Warsaw Convention will follow Zicherman.
92. See In re Korean Air Lines Disaster, 932 F.2d 1475, 1478 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
93. See Domangue v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 722 F.2d 256, 262 (5th Cir. 1984)
(stating that prejudgment and postjudgment interest are recoverable under the Warsaw
Convention beyond the damage limit); Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co., 814 F. Supp.
605, 611 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (holding that prejudgment interest was appropriate given the
compensatory purpose of the Warsaw Convention, especially in light of a finding of willful
misconduct, and given the nine years that had passed between the accident and the judg-
ment).
94. See Zicherman, 814 F. Supp. at 612.
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cus the competing interests of protecting airlines from economic
ruin and adequately compensating victims of such terrorism and
their survivors. 95
A. The Terrorist's Ability to Make Explosive Devices Virtually
Undetectable
Terrorism is expanding at an unprecedented rate. Terrorists
have proven their ability to penetrate international borders by
passing explosives through security systems in thin sheets disguised
as suitcase lining, distributing them within a bag,96 and hiding them
in frozen food.97 In addition, airlines sometimes fail to perform
security checks. Prior to the July 17, 1996 explosion of Trans
World Airlines Flight 800 over Long Island, New York, TWA, for
example, failed to check luggage for explosive devices. 98 Further-
more, outgoing baggage and passengers are often searched only
for drugs and drug money, not bombs.99
Even when an aircraft's passengers and luggage are scanned
for explosives, aircraft still fall victim to explosive devices. 100 Ex-
acerbating attempts to solve this elusive problem is the fact that no
security provider can publicly estimate the capacity of terrorists
without exposing potential vulnerabilities. 101 Similarly, security
95.
Yr. No. Bombings Killed Injured Property Damage (in millions)
1989 1,065 74 495 $48.9
1990 1,275 64 385 $16.3
1991 1,585 75 695 $27.1
1992 1,911 45 469 $22.6
1993 1,880 70 1,375 $526.0
Hodgson, supra note 14, tbl. (U.S. Bombing Statistics).
96. See Michael 0. Lavitt, Luggage Inspection System Uses Resonance Technology,
AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., Feb. 5,1996, at 92, 92.
97. See David Windle, Atom Scanner Joins War on Drugs, TIMES (London), Apr. 7,
1996, at 1.
98. See Port, supra note 1, at 78.
99. See id.
100. The aircraft explosion over Lockerbie, Scotland occurred despite the departure
airport's security scan for explosive devices. See In re Air Disaster at Lockerbie, Scot.,
776 F. Supp. 710,714 (E.D.N.Y. 1991).
101. See Telephone Interview with Tom Sage, Electronics Engineer, Quantum Mag-
netics, San Diego, Cal. (Oct. 14, 1996).
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firms cannot confidently share information without the risk that
the information will find its way into terrorists' hands.102 Never-
theless, security systems continue to improve, driven by the pro-
gression of explosive devices' improved stealth. 103
B. Inadequacy of Airline and Governmental Responses
Despite knowing that nitrogen-based compounds are a key
ingredient in all explosive devices, engineers have yet to produce a
reliable method of unobtrusively scanning luggage and passengers
for explosive devices without picking up harmless components. 104
Compounding this problem is a lack of worldwide bomb scanning
standards governing international flights. 105
Nevertheless, if a prominent nation in international aviation,
such as the United States, established updated standards, the
world would likely follow. 106 If the United States implemented
these higher standards, U.S. carriers would first install scanning
devices within U.S. airports according to the standards. Insurance
companies would then encourage compliance by offering dis-
counted incentive rates based on the carrier's compliance beyond
its borders, where the carrier's insurance is in effect but U.S. law
does not apply. Presumably, carriers from other countries would
then need to conform to these standards to avoid losing market
102. See id.
103. See Windle, supra note 97. For example, bomb detection equipment at TWA's
international terminal at John F. Kennedy International Airport recently detected traces
of nitrogen-based compounds on shoes in a passenger's bag. See Bomb Fears Clear Air-
port Terminal, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 10, 1996, at A21. This finding shut down TWA's inter-
national flights for an hour and caused the evacuation of all passengers. See id. This
event demonstrates how a terrorist could tactically direct bomb units to a harmless piece
of fertilizer on a shoe and pass lethal explosives devices through security of another ter-
minal during the distraction.
104. See Bruce V. Bigelow, Scanning for Explosives, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Mar.
9, 1995, at C1 (stating that X-ray machines -developed in the 1960s are designed only to
detect metal objects, such as knives, guns, and hacksaws, but only with the skilled eye of a
trained operator, and that explosive devices hidden in the above-described manners are
difficult to detect).
105. See Port, supra note 1, at 78.
106. See id. (stating that, "[i]n Europe, airport security is the responsibility of a gov-
ernment agency or an independent for-profit operation .... [blut in the [United States],
the airlines themselves handle security" and that airlines hesitate to buy expensive secu-
rity systems because they may not meet yet-to-be announced FAA standards).
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share.' 07 In effect, such standards could lead to global standards.
The United States must recognize this leadership responsibility.
Current U.S. regulations lack adequate direction.108 After the
July 17, 1996 explosion of TWA Flight 800, President Bill Clinton
created the White House Aviation Safety and Security Commis-
sion headed by Vice President Al Gore (Gore Commission). 10 9
The Gore Commission gave its final report on airport security sys-
tems on February 11, 1997, but failed to recommend minimum
bomb scanning requirements. 110 In addition, President Clinton
proposed a $1.1 billion package to combat terrorism, of which
$429.4 million was earmarked to improve security at U.S. air-
ports.111 President Clinton also signed into law the Federal Avia-
tion Reauthorization Act of 1996, which tightened airport security
against terrorism, but failed to mandate updated minimum stan-
dards for explosive device scanning equipment.112 Unfortunately,
the minimum standards for explosive scanning equipment were
promulgated in September 1993 and require updating to reflect
improved terrorist technology,113 thus making the purchase of up-
graded equipment premature and improvident. Although it ap-
107. See generally David Field, Detector Makers Wait for Go-Ahead, USA TODAY,
Aug. 5, 1996, at D1 (stating that the U.S. House of Representatives passed a bill that
would require the FAA to "push for detectors like those used outside the [United
States]").
108. See Jennifer From, Bomb-Detection Firms Await U.S. Move, WALL ST. J., Sept.
23, 1996, at A6; Port, supra note 1, at 78 (highlighting the FAA's plans to continue field
testing bomb detection equipment through 2000, at which time the FAA may recommend,
and even statutorily mandate, a standard).
109. See From, supra note 108.
110. See Airline Passengers Face Tighter Security, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Feb. 13,
1997, at A-8; see also From, supra note 108; David Evans, Safer Skies, SAN DIEGO
UNION-TRIB., Feb. 23, 1997, at G-1.
111. See Airline Passengers Face Tighter Security, supra note 110; see also From, supra
note 108.
112. This $19 billion law "calls for upgrading bomb-detecting luggage scanners at ma-
jor airports, requires background and fingerprint checks for workers with access to airport
security areas, . . . and increases mail and.international air cargo inspections," but does
not set forth specific security system standards for spending funds. See Clinton Enacts
Tougher Airport Security Measures, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 10, 1996, at A22. It was anticipated
that the Gore Commission would promulgate these standards, but it did not. See Airline
Passengers Face Tighter Security, supra note 110.
113. See Field, supra note 107 ("lowering FAA detection standards 'means that [the
airlines] may catch the amateur and the sloppy but not the dedicated or professional ter-
rorist."').
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pears that the United States is rising to the leadership challenge in
this area, its actions are hollow because the Gore Commission
failed to specify revised standards, and thus, airlines likely will not
purchase updated equipment.
114
1. Airlines' Reactions
Unwilling to wait for governmental direction, some airlines
are buying the best equipment available. Unfortunately, the U.S.
airlines are using that equipment only outside the United States
because they fear that the equipment will become obsolete once
the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) promulgates new
standards. 115 This domestic passivity effectively sends the message
worldwide that the United States is vulnerable to terrorism. 116
Although an airline can speculate as to existing equipment
that is likely to meet future minimum standards,1 17 the equipment
is extremely expensive. 118 The expense of these machines imposes
114. See Clinton Enacts Tougher Airport Security Measures, supra note 112; see also
Airline Passengers Face Tighter Security, supra note 110. Although the Gore Commission
recommended 54 machines for 450 airports, this effort "falls far short of what is needed"
and is "'ludicrous."' Evans, supra note 110 (quoting Victoria Cummock, a member of the
Gore Commission who also served as a member of the Security Baseline Work Group, an
advisory body to the FAA, and as president of Families of Pan Am 103/Lockerbie).
"'The administration is not facing up to the issue of funding"'. Id. (quoting Neilson Ber-
tholf, Jr., chairman of the American Association of Airport Executives). The Gore
Commission has proposed, however, "at least $500 million in extra federal funding over
the next five years to pay for high priority airport security projects," including 1,182 se-
curity force personnel, which is a 173% increase over 1997's security work force. Asra Q.
Nomani & Andy Pasztor, Aviation Panel Urges Security Spending, WALL ST. J., Feb. 10,
1997, at A3.
115. "'It's ironic,' says Thermedics President John W. Wood Jr. 'If you want to be
screened with the latest in U.S. explosive-detection technology, you need to fly out of a
European airport."' Port, supra note 1, at 79; see also Evans, supra note 110 (stating that
the FAA has certified only one scanning machine, the CTX-5000SP, but that it "can only
examine medium-size bags and smaller - leaving up to 40 percent of the larger bags on
some international flights unexamined").
116. Maine Senator William Cohen states, "'If we continue to wait for the perfect sys-
tem ... terrorism will flock to the United States just as a burglar goes for the open win-
dow."' Field, supra note 107.
117. See From, supra note 108 (stating that President Clinton's proposed $1.1 billion
dollar package to combat terrorism, of which $429.4 million is earmarked for airport se-
curity, requests the purchase of 54 InVision Technologies Inc. CTX 5000s, 489 unnamed
companies' trace detectors, and 5 quadrupole-resonance systems, which Quantum Mag-
netics will likely supply).
118. For example, the machines referenced in supra note 117 are priced as follows:
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a barrier to a fledgling airline's survival in or entrance into the in-
ternational market, thus making the Warsaw Convention's liability
cap more appealing.11 9 Although technology continues to advance
and has become more accessible, for example, via the Internet, ter-
rorists will inevitably find a way to bypass even the most sophisti-
cated scanners. Many hope, however, that if all explosives contain
nitrogen-based compounds and all passengers and baggage can be
scanned, the combination of Quantum Magnetics' quadrupole
technology and Thermedics' explosive sniffing technology will, in
addition to similar products, prevent terrorists from bombing air-
lines. 120
2. Governmental Responses
Until this scanning technology becomes mandatory, the U.S.
government's response will be to encourage airlines to conduct
more thorough passenger and luggage searches. Although in-
tended to improve air traffic safety, these searches will produce a
host of problems. First, air travel will become less convenient due
to search time requirements.
Second, airlines will encounter legal difficulties when enacting
approximately $1,000,000 for one CTX 5000; $125,000 to $300,000 for the American Sci-
ence & Engineering (AS & E) 101-ZZ trace detector, depending on the automation level;
$250,000 to $400,000 for the Vivid Technologies twin-beam X-ray system, depending on
the automation level; $165,000 for the Thermedics explosive sniffer; and $300,000 for the
Quantum Magnetics Qscan 2000 Quadrupole Resonance scanner. See From, supra note
108; Field, supra note 107.
. 119. For many plaintiffs, proving inadequate anti-hijacking procedures is not difficult.
In Grey v. American Airlines, Inc., 227 F.2d 282 (2d Cir. 1955), plaintiffs, in their attempt
to avoid the limit on recovery in article 25(1) of the Warsaw Convention, had the burden
of proving willful misconduct by "a fair preponderance of the credible evidence." Id. at
285. The court stated that this standard "required proof of a 'conscious intent to do or
omit doing an act from which harm results to another, or an intentional omission of a
manifest duty. There must be a realization of the probability of injury from the conduct,
and a disregard of the probable consequences of such conduct."' Id. (quoting the district
court's jury instructions). Given the extensive media coverage of recent airline mishaps,
today's public is undoubtedly aware of'the hazards of inadequate personnel and baggage
screening.
120. Quantum Magnetics' quadrupole resonance scanner emits radio waves that
stimulate only the cigar- or disk-shaped nuclei common in explosives' molecules. See Port,
supra note 1, at 79. The scanner then detects the molecules as they reform into their
original shape. See Hodgson, supra note 14. This procedure is completely unrelated to
detecting nitrogen-based molecules. See Port, supra note 1, at 79. The Thermedics ex-
plosive sniffer can detect even "a few molecules of explosive left on a terrorist's shoes or
hands." Id.
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these more intrusive search methods.121 Despite the fact that vir-
tually all passengers are not terrorists, sufficient probable cause
exists under U.S. law for every passenger to be subject to an ex-
tensive and intrusive search. Such a search, however, could be a
significant cultural challenge in other countries. This new charac-
teristic of international air transportation could make air travel
less appealing, thus undermining the financial certainty intended
by the Warsaw Convention.
Third, many existing X-ray machines will become obsolete
once the new standards are adopted, thereby requiring purchases
of conforming equipment. This requirement alone may cause air-
lines financial difficulties because they may be unable to pass
along the costs directly to customers due to existing fare wars and
market competition. The General Accounting Office estimates
that costs to develop, buy, install, and begin operating explosive
detection systems at the seventy-five busiest airports could reach
$6 billion over ten years. 122 Eventually, however, passengers
would have to pay for the improved security safeguards.
VI. ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVES TO THE WARSAW CONVENTION'S
PROVISIONS
Proponents of amending or adding conditions to the Warsaw
Convention often underestimate the legal and economic effects of
their suggestions. Although some proposals have merit if carefully
implemented, changing the Warsaw Convention's primary provi-
sions will create moreproblems than it will solve.
A. Raising the Liability Limit
Advocates of raising the liability limit resemble high school
sweethearts determined to wed. They unduly minimize the risks
and the ramifications that follow. Many scholars and plaintiffs' at-
torneys have argued, however, for increasing the Warsaw Conven-
121. The AS & E X-ray screener basically performs a strip search without requiring
the removal of a person's clothing. See Port, supra note 1, at 78 photo. Although obtain-
ing a waiver or consent may be a solution, no careful terrorist could be expected to con-
sent to a thorough search with the available technology discussed above. See Airline Pas-
sengers Face Tighter Security, supra note 110 (noting that American Civil Liberties Union
counsel Gregory Nojeim objected to the Gore Commission's recommendations because
such surveillance techniques are "'invasive and likely to be discriminatory'.").
122. See Field, supra note 107.
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tion's liability limit.123 They advocate for raising the liability limit
to a figure calculated as: (1) the original $8,333 adjusted by an
agreed upon worldwide inflationary average since 1929, or (2) the
$75,000 inflated by an agreed upon worldwide inflationary average
since 1966.124 Both methods would raise the cap to approximately
$335,000.125 Either way, pandemonium would erupt for most air-
lines because future costs are predicted and calculated in accor-
dance with existing liability limits. If the limit is increased, airline
insurance premiums would skyrocket, costs would be passed along
to passengers, and ultimately, fewer people would be able to afford
either domestic or international air travel.
126
B. Amending the Warsaw Convention to Make Airlines Strictly
Liable for Any Mishap
Proponents of an amendment to the Warsaw Convention in-
vite the signatory countries to change the standard for determining
liability from negligence to strict liability. 127 These proponents
myopically base their argument on the media-instilled assumption
that pilot errors in judgment or management deficiencies always
cause aviation mishaps. 128 While this assumption may be true,
following a more careful examination of the issue, these propo-
nents would likely conclude that pilot error often occurs after an
.unforeseeable mechanical problem not mentioned by the press
129
and/or undiscovered in the crash analysis. 130 Arguably, most pilot
123. See generally Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 6 (discussing the general ar-
guments in favor of raising the liability limit).
124. See id. at 544-52.
125. See Reske, supra note 10, at 23.
126. See Telephone Interview with Jeff Worth, Aviation Attorney (Jan. 7, 1997)
[hereinafter Worth Interview].,
127. The res ipsa loquitur doctrine is no longer applied to all aviation accidents. With
recent improvements in technology, however, the doctrine has renewed appeal. See gen-
erally Newing v. Cheatham, 540 P.2d 33 (Cal. 1975).
128. See generally id.
129. For example, the May 11, 1996 crash of ValuJet Flight 592 over the Florida Ev-
erglades was first attributed to pilot error and only later did the theory of exploding oxy-
gen containers come to light. See Patrick Harden, A Year in the Life of America; Even
Fear of Flying Couldn't Dampen Spirits in an Upbeat Election Year, TORONTO SUN, Dec.
22, 1996, at C6; Evans, supra note 110.
130. This statement is based on prepared studies of military and civilian aviation mis-
haps that the author analyzed in Naval Flight School, Pensacola, Florida, as well as on
[Vol. 19:633658
Terror in the Sky
error is a product of an unprecedented mechanical failure to which
the pilot reasonably responds, but in an unsuccessful manner.
The advocates for a strict liability standard simplistically be-
lieve, however, that airplanes rarely fall from the sky due to pure
mechanical failure, and in this sense, the overinclusive nature of
the liability determination is harmless. Indeed, airplanes rarely
explode spontaneously in midair or on the ground. To follow such
reasoning, however, is ludicrous. Strict liability would deprive
carriers of due process because mechanical defects beyond a car-
rier's control sometimes cause mishaps. Holding an airline ac-
countable for these problems therefore misappropriates liability.
Furthermore, a negligence standard is vital to an airline's in-
surance selection and overall financial strategy.1 31 Airlines and
their insurance companies use historical data to roughly predict
how often the airline is likely to be deemed negligent in the fu-
ture.132 Predicting how often new equipment will fail and how of-
ten those failures will result in injuries, however, is difficult and
less certain.133 Thus, an implementation of a strict liability stan-
dard would immediately require an airline to allocate more funds
to insurance coverage. 134 Ultimately, the costs would be passed
along to passengers or beneficiaries of any cargo transported by
air. 135
More insidiously, strict liability under the Warsaw Convention
would have far-reaching and unpredictable domino effects. The
signatories should decline this invitation. It is akin to a proposal to
alter the atmospheric content of important life-sustaining ele-
ments.
C. Adding a Small Surcharge to All Plane Ticket Prices
Several members of Congress point to a flying tax of one dol-
lar per passenger ticket that funded the completed modernization
of the U.S. Customs Agency and propose that a similar flying tax
accident reports that the author reviewed as a Marine aviator. The author has flown over
1000 hours in tactical jets in the U.S. Marine Corps, including 35 combat missions in Des-
ert Storm.
131. See Worth Interview, supra note 126.
132. See id.
133. See id.
134. See id.
135. See id.
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could be used to fund a future modernization of explosive device
scanners. 136 After all, over one million suitcases are shipped daily
aboard U.S. passenger aircraft. 137 This tax could erase the feared
future cost of improved security systems for struggling airlines.
The proposal, overlooks the fact, however, that after the improved
security systems are in place, the tax would be lifted.138
To remedy the Warsaw Convention liability limit, the "flying"
tax should instead continue even after improved security systems
are in place. Excess tax revenues should then be deposited into a
general fund accessible to airlines found liable for damages ex-
ceeding the Warsaw Convention liability limit. Airlines could
withdraw funds in amounts proportional to their international pas-
senger contributions at the time of a mishap. If the damages ex-
ceed the airline's passenger contribution, the airline would be ac-
countable for the difference. 139
Criticism that willful wrongdoers would actually escape ac-
countability by having the judgments against them ironically paid
by the victims has not gone unnoticed. When balanced with the
original intent of the Warsaw Convention to help struggling air-
lines, however, the general fund suggestion has merit. Manufac-
turers utilize a similar system in insuring themselves against prod-
ucts liability judgments, although the fund is handled privately on
an individual company-by-company basis.
D. Amending the Warsaw Convention to Allow Passengers the
Option of Buying Flight Insurance
A fourth possible option is amending the Warsaw Convention
to exempt all signatory country airlines from liability beyond an
amount lower than the current $75,000 limit. As amended, the
Warsaw Convention would require that each passenger show proof
of medical and life insurance before flying, similar to car rental
136. See Port, supra note 1, at 79; see also Evans, supra note 110 (stating that the Gore
Commission rejected the idea of a security surcharge).
137. See Bigelow, supra note 104.
138. The U.S. Customs tax was lifted when collected revenues equaled the needed
amount. See id.
.139. In a typical airline insurance policy against willful misconduct judgments, the air-
line bears a substantial deductible. See Worth Interview, supra note 126. The general
fund would help the airline meet its deductible.
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agencies requiring proof of automobile insurance. The Warsaw
Convention would then provide each passenger with the option of
buying additional life and/or medical insurance from the airline
beyond a mandatory minimum amount included in the purchase
price of each ticket, perhaps to cover funeral expenses or basic
hospital care. 140 Such a plan would mimic the additional insurance
made available by car rental agencies.
No society would likely tolerate this plan. Although the air-
lines would embrace such a scheme because of enormous cost
savings, they would not want to be perceived as encouraging their
respective governments to amend the Warsaw Convention into
this form. Furthermore, no airline, would want to participate first
in the amended provisions, as the public relations effect would be
an implicit admission that the airline expects crashes in the future.
The obvious result is that the airline would face consumer reluc-
tance to fly on that particular airline.
Global, simultaneous implementation of this option, however,
may have promise. This alternative would avoid the negative pub-
lic relations spotlight focusing on one airline and would allow in-
dividual passengers the freedom to choose increased life and
medical insurance coverage.
E. Individual Countries Could Withdraw as Signatories
A country could withdraw as a signatory from the Warsaw
Convention to avoid the liability presumptions that the Warsaw
Convention deprives signatories. The consequential insurance cost
increase and the subsequent passage of these costs to passengers,
however, would be financial suicide. 141 These costs could effec-
tively isolate a country from future economic development. They
could also result in increased litigation costs as plaintiffs fight for
every cent of recovery and defendant airlines are forced to incur
additional legal defense expenses.
Alternatively, a country could withdraw as a signatory, install
state-of-the-art security measures in an attempt to avoid insurance
cost increases, and remain uncertain about preventing all terrorist
140. Each airline ticket would have a warning, similar to the U.S. Surgeon General's
warning on cigarettes, stating that a passenger assumes the risks inherent in flying, and
furthermore, agrees to hold the airline liable for the damages set forth in the ticket.
141. See Worth Interview, supra note 126.
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activity.142 Predicting when and where terrorist activity will occur
is still a gamble. Only one international airline, Quantas Airways,
can claim that it has never been a victim of terrorism.
143
VII. THE EXISTING LIABILITY LIMIT IS THE BEST AVAILABLE
OPTION
As no one today can predict the future course of terrorism, all
airlines remain vulnerable. The consequences of little or no inter-
national air travel, however, can easily be predicted. International
air travel must continue at an economically accessible level so that
global economic integration continues. Failing to protect airlines
with the Warsaw Convention liability limit would undoubtedly
hamper economic development and isolate all countries. There-
fore, the existing liability limit must remain in effect.
A. Comparison to International Maritime Law, the U.S. Military's
Gonzalez Act, and U.S. Worker's Compensation Recovery Plans
The Warsaw Convention's liability limits have parallels in
other contexts. International maritime law, 144 the U.S. military's
Gonzalez Act, 145 and U.S. workers compensation laws 146 limit the
142. See discussion supra Part V.A.
143. See Telephone Interview with Julie Lima, Employee, Quantas Airways (Feb. 12,
1997).
144. See Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. app. § 883 (1988); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436
U.S. 618 (1978) (discussing the general intent to limit liability in maritime accidents);
Chan v. Society Expeditions, Inc., 39 F.3d 1398 (9th Cir. 1994) (stating that victims or
survivors of maritime mishaps are limited in their recoveries).
145. See Gonzalez Act, 10 U.S.C.A. § 1089; (1974) (stating that suits for traditional
damage awards against military medical personnel are not allowed); 'see also United
States v. Smith, 499 U.S. 158, 167 (1991) (stating that the Federal Employees Liability
Reform and Tort Compensation Act, 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1346, 2671-2679(b)(1), 2680, immu-
nizes federal government physicians from malpractice liability even when the Federal
Tort Claims Act precludes recovery against the United States); Expeditions Unlimited
Aquatic Enters., Inc., v. Smithsonian Inst., 566 F.2d 289 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (stating that the
government and its employees while working in an official capacity enjoy general tort
immunity from suits brought by other government employees).
146. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 3601 (West 1989) (stating that employees injured
on the job are not subject to a liability determination regardless of whether they are enti-
tled to medical expenses incident to that injury); see also Benjamin v. Ricks, 132 Cal.
Rptr. 758, 760 (Ct. App. 1976) (stating that "[t]he limitation upon an employee's right to
recover from his employer damages for pain and suffering is rationally related to a legiti-
mate governmental interest").
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amount that a potential plaintiff may recover because of varying
competing interests. These laws are designed to shelter affected
organizations fi'om litigating each claim and to facilitate prompt
recovery by victims. 147 The laws also promote an industry's con-
tinued existence by preventing a "survival of the fittest" effect in
which companies that can handle all claims grow stronger and
those that cannot file bankruptcy.
148
The parallels to the international aviation industry are clear.
The Warsaw Convention recognizes the same concerns by limiting
recovery in cases of presumed liability. Like international sea
transportation, U.S. military medical malpractice immunity, and
U.S. workers compensation law, the air transportation system's
survival cannot be torpedoed without sacrificing the benefits to all.
Thus, the Warsaw Convention liability limit should be maintained
for the economic greater good.
B. Terrorism Has Created a Barrier to Third World Countries
Trying to Enter the International Air Transportation Industry
The economic integration of all nations is vital for the future.
Most countries would find it difficult, if not impossible, to grow in
an international economy without an adequate capacity for inter-
national aviation. 149 Yet terrorism can discourage investors from
developing an airline. 150
When an airline cannot be found liable for an incident, the
airport may shoulder the blame and its associated costs. As a non-
carrier, the airport is not protected under the Warsaw Conven-
tion's liability limit. For example, an airport, not an airline, was
found liable for a passenger's death during a terrorist attack in the
airport where the passenger was still in a public area at the time of
the attack and had not passed through immigration control or a se-
curity inspection. 151 Sim ilarly, because a court held that passen-
gers were not "in the course of any of the operations of embarking
or disembarking" when they were killed during a terrorist attack in
the baggage area of an international airport, the Warsaw Conven-
147. See generally sources cited supra notes 144-146.
148. See generally sources cited supra notes 144-146.
149. See discussion supra Part II.B.
150. See discussion supra Part V.B.1.
151. See Buonocore v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 900 F.2d 8, 9-10 (2d Cir. 1990).
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tion could not offer its protective liability cap to the airline, and
thus, the court held the airport liable for the passengers' deaths.152
Similarly, Trans World Airlines (TWA) was found free of liability
under the Warsaw Convention for injuries that its passengers suf-
fered at the Rome airport while they were in line to receive
boarding passes and to check in their luggage when terrorists at-
tacked with machine guns and grenades because the passengers
were not yet engaged in the "operation of embarking" under the
Warsaw Convention.153
C. Insurance Costs with and Without the Warsaw Convention
Liability Limit
With protection from unlimited liability absent a finding of
willful misconduct, an airline will pay an annual, insurance pre-
mium that is "significantly" higher than it would pay without such
protection. 154 The added cost could run out of business an inter-
national carrier not covered by the Warsaw Convention if it com-
petes with carriers paying lower insurance premiums and similar
costs.155  The carrier not covered by the Warsaw Convention
would be forced to pass the added costs to passengers in the form
of increased ticket prices, resulting in decreased profits and possi-
ble bankruptcy for the airline.
This analysis unfortunately applies to established airlines with
fixed costs much lower than a newer entrant to the international
air travel market. Start-up costs vary tremendously; however, in-
surance rates for an unproven airline that is not covered by the
Warsaw Convention and is seeking to fly internationally
"substantially" exceed the rates for an established international
carrier. 156 These higher insurance rates impose a huge disadvan-
tage on potential new market entrants in an already low profit
margin industry.
152. See In re Tel Aviv, 405 F. Supp. 154, 155-56 (D.P.R. 1975), affd, sub nom.,
Matinez Hernandez v. Air Fr., 545 F.2d 279 (Ist Cir. 1976).
153. See Sweis v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 681 F. Supp. 501, 505 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
154. See Green Interview, supra note 79.
155. See Interview with Michael Kribel, Commercial Airline Insurance Underwriter
(Feb. 3, 1997) [hereinafter Kribel Interview].
156. See id.
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Self-insurance is an alternative. 157 An airline can set aside
money regularly; however, the, enormous sums necessary to rea-
sonably protect investments and liability interests are prohibitive
for most airlines. For example, it is estimated that, if TWA is
found liable for damages above the Warsaw Convention limit for
its possible willful misconduct in Flight 800, victims' damages
could amount to $500 million. 158 Problems also exist with poten-
tial internal commingling of operating funds with retirement funds
guaranteed at a predetermined interest rate that the airline later
finds which is later found unaffordable. 159 This problem occurs to
the detriment of many employees vested in an airline's pension
plan.160
D. Costs of Minimum Passenger and Baggage Monitoring Staff and
Equipment
Although the FAA has claimed that staff requirements for
mandated scanning equipment will decrease because the equip-
ment would be fully automatic, 161 costs nevertheless remain fixed
for minimum passenger and baggage monitoring staff and equip-
ment. Adding the possibility of unlimited liability, it is likely that
airlines would chose to monitor their baggage and personnel scan-
ners with more staff despite the automatic nature of the machines.
Training costs would increase concomitantly as airlines sought to
protect themselves from terrorist attacks and meet minimum stan-
dards to avoid findings of willful misconduct.
An option always exists for airlines to operate beyond the
reach of U.S. laws without the minimum required equipment to
scan passengers and luggage. Increased insurance rates may, how-
ever, discourage pursuit of this option. Insurance rates for an air-
line with the anticipated minimally mandated scanning equipment
should run lower than the rates for an airline operating without the
minimally mandated scanning equipment. 162
157. See Worth Interview, supra note 126.
158. See Edward H. Phillips, Willful Misconduct Charges May Loom, AVIATION WK.
& SPACE TECH., Aug. 19,1996, at 87, 87.
159. See Worth Interview, supra note 126.
160. See id.
161. See Port, supra note 1, at 78.
162. See Kribel Interview, supra note 155.
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E. Protracted Litigation Would Not Facilitate Maximum Recovery
Amounts
Litigation is shortened when the plaintiff in an aviation mis-
hap case makes no claim that the airline engaged in willful mis-
conduct. Consequently, the plaintiff is limited in his recovery to
$75,000. Without limits on recoverable amounts, however, both
parties would have every incentive to litigate vigorously, conse-
quently delaying a party's recovery. Likewise, airlines would have
every incentive to defend themselves by utilizing their often supe-
rior capital resources.163 The airline's insurance company supplies
these financial resources, but only after the airline pays an in-
creased premium with funds made available from higher ticket
prices charged to all passengers. 164
F. No Feasible Alternative Exists Without Destroying Global
Economic Interdependence
Today, airline competition worldwide has driven down profit
margins so that any airline burdened by excessive costs is at a sig-
nificant disadvantage. Costs are forecast years in advance and de-
viations from expectations incur domino effects throughout the
company, industry, and often country. Usually, the ripple effect of
unexpected costs is unknowable in scope and magnitude. In short,
no feasible alternative exists.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Although technology may have closed the door on nitrogen-
based explosives finding their way through luggage and personnel
scanners, it is not certain that terrorism will never again affect in-
ternational air travel through some other newly developed means.
To encourage worldwide economic development and airline par-
ticipation in the global marketplace, the barriers to entering the in-
ternational air travel market must be minimal. The threat of un-
limited damages for a single unfortunate air mishap is undoubtedly
the most significant economic deterrent for airlines contemplating
entrance into the international market. As economic globalization
and the need for international access to air travel increases, air-
163. See Scully Interview, supra note 3.
164. See id.
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lines should be encouraged to expand into overseas travel, not dis-
suaded from doing so. Although the Warsaw Convention's liabil-
ity limit has its drawbacks, it must remain unchanged to ensure a
future with worldwide access to international air transportation.
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